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Abstract 
Ordoliberalism is widely considered to be the dominant ideology of the German political elite 
today and consequently responsible at least in part for its hard ‘austerity’ line during the recent 
Eurozone crisis. This article presents a genealogy of the main concerns, concepts and problems 
around which early German ordoliberalism was formed and structured as a political and 
economic ideology. Early ordoliberalism is shown to be rooted in an interwar Germanophone 
Lutheran Evangelical tradition of anti-humanist ‘political ethics’. Its specific conceptions of the 
market, the state, the individual, freedom and duty were developed on a Lutheran Evangelical 
basis. Analytically, the article considers ideological influences of theology on political and 
economic theory not so much in terms of consensus and ideational overlap, but rather in terms 
of shared concerns, concepts and problems across different positions.  
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1. Introduction: Unity and Variety in Neoliberalism 
In Colombel’s (1994, p. 128) accurate rephrasing of Foucault’s (1993, p. 35) ‘history of the 
present’, genealogy is ‘the history of a problem of which the present relevance must be 
assessed’. One such problem, one that is of major political, cultural and sociological interest in 
Europe today, relates to the particular German tradition of economic and political thinking 
termed ordoliberalism. Since the 2008 financial crisis and particularly with the ensuing 
Eurozone crisis, scholars in political economy and related disciplines have discussed 
intensively whether Germany’s hard-line ‘austerity’ policy towards ‘periphery’ countries – 
Greece in particular – reflects the ordoliberal ideology in which the German political elite was 
born and raised. In the eyes of some, ordoliberalism’s emphasis on debtor responsibility (no 
bail-out), budgetary surplus as the objective of fiscal policy, low-inflation targeting as the sole 
goal of monetary policy, and advocacy for de-politicised technocratic (rule-based) economic 
policy in general, have been omnipresent (Blyth, 2013; Hillebrand, 2015; Matthijs & 
McNamara, 2015; Nedergaard & Snaith, 2015; Young, 2014). Others strongly oppose this view, 
arguing that if old ordoliberalism was ever relevant to understanding German politics at all, it 
has no influence today over real political interests in explaining the German position (see 
Berghahn, 2015; Feld, Köhler, & Nientiedt, 2015; Wigger, 2017).  
Taking a step back from this unresolved debate, it is worthwhile asking ourselves if we 
have really understood what ordoliberalism is. To be sure, publications that describe and discuss 
the economic and political tenets of ordoliberalism are now abundant (in addition to the above, 
see Bonefeld, 2012; Felice & Vatiero, 2014; Siems & Schnyder, 2014; Vatiero, 2015). But 
digging deeper, following Colombel, we may ask: what were the problems that originally 
concerned and shaped ordoliberalism as a political and economic current of thought and what 
is the present relevance of those problems? This is no small endeavour. Indeed, the present 
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article will deliver only on the first part of the question: identifying the original concerns and 
problems. The second step – assessing their contemporary relevance for understanding the 
politics of the Eurozone crisis – will be no less demanding and will require separate treatment 
elsewhere. There are hints provided in the existing literature, as we shall see, but its completion 
would presuppose a solid answer to the first part of the question, which is what this article sets 
out to provide.  
The article’s main contribution is intended to be establishing that when ordoliberalism 
emerged in interwar Germany, it was not solely a response to the political and economic turmoil 
of the time (hyperinflation, mass unemployment, the chaos of parliamentary democracy and the 
fall of the Weimar Republic), as is often stated. At its very core, early ordoliberalism was also 
shaped by specific Lutheran Evangelical concerns, concepts and problems of ‘political ethics’ 
that significantly occupied the Protestant German intelligentsia at the time. To appreciate this 
argument, familiarity is needed with ordoliberalism’s overall topology. Most sociologists are 
acquainted with ordoliberalism only via Foucault’s (2004) lectures on the birth of ‘biopolitics’ 
– a direct translation, by the way, of the ordoliberal notion of Vitalpolitik.  
Ordoliberalism is a difficult ideology to position within the ‘neoliberal thought collective’ 
(Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). In contrast to Chicago-style laissez-faire neoliberalism, 
ordoliberalism emerged from European attempts at conceiving a ‘new liberalism’ with a strong 
state, to tame predatory capitalism in the first half of the twentieth century (Schulz-Forberg, 
2013; Cerny, 2016). Ordoliberalism, says Blyth (2013, p. 57), was always far from the mantra 
of ‘markets good, state bad’, but professed the idea that the state provides the framework 
conditions ‘within which markets can operate’ (see also Siems & Schnyder, 2014). In 
ordoliberalism, the role of the ‘strong state’ is rather as a bulwark against the abuse of market 
and state power by powerful individuals, companies, or social groups that characterises 
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predatory capitalism (Bonefeld, 2012; Davies, 2014; Mudge, 2008). In order to function as a 
bulwark against power interests, the ordoliberal state apparatus must be ‘neutral’ – it must not 
be the arena of chaotic parliamentarian conflict and the shifting instrument of whoever happens 
to be in power. Yet, the ordoliberals were generally not in favour of dictatorial authority, but 
rather technocratic authority. Contrary to Carl Schmitt, the ordoliberals wanted the state 
apparatus in its function as custodian of the ‘competition order’ to be de-politicised. From this 
perspective, the ordoliberals defined their ‘third way’ or ‘new liberalism’ not only in opposition 
to collectivism (Communism, Social Democracy, Keynesianism), but also to classical 
‘Manchester’ laissez-faire liberalism. In fact, they defined themselves as anti-capitalists. To 
them, what they called a true ‘competition order’ required a strong state to hinder the formation 
of power groups (monopolies, cartels, labour unions) in the market and to set up the 
constitutional legal framework for competition to be fair for everyone (Bonefeld, 2012; Felice 
& Vatiero, 2014; Gerber, 2001; Siems & Schnyder, 2014; Vatiero, 2015). Moreover, they saw 
the cultural development of free entrepreneurial individuals as a complementary necessity to 
the legal constitution of the market. This was the aim of what they called Vitalpolitik or ‘vitality 
politics’ as an alternative to collectivist welfare-state programs (Siems & Schnyder, 2014; 
Bonefeld, 2017). 
Genealogy contributes to the above doctrinal understanding of early ordoliberalism by 
unearthing the Lutheran Evangelical inheritance underlying its central political and economic 
tenets. In fact, I argue, in early ordoliberalism the ‘strong state’ was not promoted for its own 
sake, but because it could act as the only legitimate ‘worldly authority’ in the Lutheran sense: 
de-personalised, de-humanised and consequently de-politicised and technocratic. Lutheran 
Evangelicalism is radically different from the popular vision of Christianity as a humanist 
religion. In Lutheran Evangelicalism, no human sense of justice is legitimate since God alone 
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knows justice. Consequently, while the state inevitably needs to be run by sinful human beings, 
it must not be subjugated to their personal sense of right and wrong; the only solution is to be 
rule-based and technocratic. In the ‘political ethics’ of German interwar Lutheran 
Evangelicalism, Christian love for one’s neighbour is not the love of one person for the other, 
but love expressed as ‘duty’ to worldly authority – as technocratic service to the anonymous 
‘order’ of the state, even when this service requires the use of violence. Adopting this notion of 
anonymous order, I argue, the early ordoliberalism expanded it to extend also to ‘competition 
order’. In other words, like that of the ‘strong state’, the ordoliberal promotion of free markets 
was not fundamentally due to it being ‘just’ or even ‘efficient’ in human terms (as in utilitarian 
Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire neoliberalism), but precisely because well-regulated competition 
(safeguarded against the accumulation of power) serves as an anonymous, a-human ordering 
mechanism for society.  
The analysis is conducted at the level of discourse (Foucault, 2008) by showing the 
continuities of concerns, concepts and problems running from a specific passage in Saint Paul’s 
Epistle to the Romans, via Luther and the ‘political ethics’ of early 20th Century German 
Lutheran Evangelicalism, to the first formulations of ordoliberalism between the early 1930s 
and the mid-1950s. At each step in this history there were bifurcations, and thus the same 
passages in the Bible and in Luther have also motivated other, including humanist, forms of 
Protestantism and liberalism – to some of which ‘political ethics’ and early ordoliberalism were 
vehemently opposed. In other words, the history of discursive continuities is not teleological, 
but rather retro-active at every step, as old utterances are mobilised into new contexts. In 
focusing the analysis on such discursive continuities, I take certain biographical elements as 
pre-givens already established by existing literature – in particular the devoted Protestant faith 
of all the protagonists of early ordoliberalism (Manow, 2001; see also Hien, 2017a, 2017b). 
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Indeed, Manow (2001, 2010) characterises early ordoliberalism as ‘economic order theology’ 
and diagnoses Germany’s so-called ‘social market economy’ as a post-war compromise 
between Protestant and Catholic economic and political thought. Hien (2017b, p. 5) explains 
that the Protestant roots of ordoliberalism set it apart from Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism due to 
its conception of human beings as ‘saints and sinners at the same time’, which is ‘why they 
need to be under an institutional order that disciplines the sinner’. The ‘strong state’, in turn, 
would have to be designed so as to de-politicise the economy and society in general (Manow, 
2010, p. 2).  
But the existing literature is open for elaboration on more precisely how Protestantism 
shaped the early ordoliberal conceptions of freedom and the state. It has searched for points of 
doctrinal identity between ordoliberalism and Protestant theology and tends to end where 
disagreement between them surfaces. For example, Manow concludes his analysis at the point 
where his ordoliberal protagonists start criticising the ‘political ethics’ of the order theologians 
in demanding unconditional obedience to worldly authorities, even national socialist ones 
(Manow, 2001, p. 189). Hien (2017a, p. 266) suggests that early ordoliberalism ‘might bear the 
imprint of both mainline Lutheranism and ascetic Protestantism’ although, following Weber 
(1965), Calvinism is traditionally associated with the development of Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire 
neoliberalism. But Hien remains at the level of hypothesis and he, too, restricts himself to the 
search for points of theoretical consensus between theological and economic doctrines, stating 
that this ‘could’ be the case and that it ‘would’ then explain ‘the schizophrenia of ordoliberalism 
when considering the strong institutions’ (Hien, 2017a, p. 266). Indeed, as will become clear, 
interwar Germanophone Lutheran Evangelicalism – as well as the early ordoliberals – were not 
dismissive of Calvin. But what occupied them was a specific set of concepts, concerns and 
problems across the writings of Luther and Calvin that were different from the concepts, 
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concerns and problems in Luther and Calvin that occupied the reformed Protestant sects 
analysed by Weber (1965) or the liberal Lutheran theology of Troeltsch and others (see Adair-
Toteff, 2017).  
On this basis, the present article makes the double contribution of (a) substantiating our 
understanding of the Protestant roots of early ordoliberalism and (b) changing the focus from 
points of doctrinal identity to the continuity of concerns, concepts and problems across Lutheran 
Evangelicalism and early ordoliberalism. While the article is limited to the history of the 
problems that defined early ordoliberalism, as a way of setting the overall perspective of the 
contribution made, it is worthwhile briefly alluding to possible directions for future research in 
taking up the challenge of assessing their present relevance. Blyth (2013, p. 57) represents the 
widespread view that ordoliberalism became ‘the governing philosophy of German economic 
elites’ after WWII, but specialists in the field emphasise the compromises made with other 
ideologies, notably Catholic social thought (Manow, 2010). However, the Protestant 
underpinning of ordoliberalism still appear today. For example, based on the speeches of 
German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble and central bank President Jens Weidmann 
between 2010 and 2015, Hien (2017b) has recently pointed to the central role of their Lutheran 
faith in their ideological and political positions during the Eurozone crisis. Contrary to many 
political economists, Hien and Joerges (2018) argue that the economic tenets of ordoliberalism 
cannot be decoupled from its core principles of law and culture that have been marginalised in 
the EU project and during the Eurocrisis by Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire neoliberalism, but also 
point to its enduring importance to the German political elite. This suggests that the debate over 
ordoliberalism’s possible influence on policy and politics, historically as well as today, can 
probably not be settled without a deep understanding of its formation and structure as an 
ideology (see also Hien, 2017a). In this way, the present article aims to contribute to the 
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sociological study of the interplay between cultural and political dimensions of contemporary 
European societies. It also helps to distinguish ordoliberalism, with its Lutheran Evangelical 
roots, from the secularised ‘Protestant ethic’ of utilitarianism analysed by Weber and, by 
extension, from the tradition of laissez faire liberalism. 
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the genealogical approach and its 
relevance for the present contribution. Section 3 analyses the theological genealogy of early 
ordoliberalism in its characteristic concepts, concerns and problems. Section 4 discusses early 
ordoliberalism in comparison with Weber’s ‘Protestant ethics’ and argues for a distinction 
between the two discourses based not on Calvin and Luther, but on different concerns, concepts 
and problems. Section 5 concludes and points out directions for future research.  
 
2. Towards a Genealogy of Early Ordoliberalism 
The early ordoliberals knew the Lutheran Evangelical ‘political ethics’ of their contemporary 
theologian colleagues well. But it would be mistaken to hinge the validity of the entire 
genealogy on questions of whether the early ordoliberals agreed or not with certain precise 
doctrines in political ethics, or on whether they got their central concerns, concepts and 
problems directly from reading these specific authors or via other sources. These are almost by 
definition irresolvable biographical questions that – if overemphasised – involve the risk of 
blurring the discursive continuity of problems, concerns and concepts in the search for doctrinal 
uniformity and direct interpersonal transmissions of ideas. On the one hand, the early 
ordoliberals did in fact read and seemed to appreciate the authors of ‘political ethics’. Röpke 
(1944, p. 28) cites Brunner (1943) with reverence. Müller-Armack (1968b, p. 562) mentions 
Barth and Brunner in his ‘social irenic’. Eucken approves of Brunner’s (1943) work on justice 
as manifesting a ‘very extensive agreement with competition order’ and only criticises his lay 
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understanding of economic mechanisms (Eucken, 1943, pp. 348–349). On the other hand, the 
ordoliberal Bonhoeffer Memorandum, which will be discussed in detail in section 3, cites 
Althaus, Brunner and Gogarten with much scepticism, arguing that their conception of divine 
orders comes dangerously close to Catholicism (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 57). In a letter to 
Röpke, Rüstow even rejects Luther and Calvin and claims that Eucken is on his side in so doing: 
‘Religion as faith, yes; religion as magic, no’ (Rüstow, 1946, p. 178). What to do with this 
contradictory ‘evidence’ on the possible direct influences of political ethics on early 
ordoliberalism and their possible doctrinal identities? For the purposes of genealogy, I argue, 
the question is ill-posed.  
The interesting question for genealogy is not whether the ordoliberals said they liked 
political ethics or not, nor whether their ideas were identical or not, nor the precise lines of 
influence that link the two, but whether or not there is continuity of problems, concerns and 
concepts between them. The early ordoliberals, I argue, were occupied with Lutheran problems, 
but of course they did more than restating Luther’s views: they provided new responses to those 
problems and concerns and added new concepts for a new historical situation. The focus in 
genealogy is on whether or not the core motivating intellectual concerns, concepts and problems 
are carried across these different literatures. Indeed, as we shall see, while the Bonhoeffer 
Memorandum expresses criticism of political ethics, its core concepts, concerns and problems 
are identical to those of political ethics. Even when Rüstow, as mentioned above, seemingly 
rejects Luther, he does so with a distinctly Lutheran Evangelical argument, as will be clear from 
section 3. Similarly, the decisive question for us to speak about ordoliberalism and oppose it to 
laissez faire liberalism is not whether the early ordoliberals agreed narrowly on a number of 
political tenets or not. For example, some ordoliberals (Müller-Armack in particular) were 
attracted to Nazism, and so were some of the theological proponents of political ethics 
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(Gogarten in particular), while others remained firm opponents (Rüstow and Röpke) or more 
tacit critics (Eucken) of the Nazi regime and ideology. Again, the decisive question for the 
genealogical analysis is rather whether the motivating concerns and problems for these different 
political and theoretical position-takings were the same.  
Likewise, the fact that the early ordoliberals agreed with Austrian and Anglo-Saxon 
laissez-faire neoliberals and economists on many points about market economy does not mean 
that the difference between them is simply a matter of ‘degrees’. As is clear, for instance, from 
the session on ‘Liberalism and Christianity’ at the first Mont Pelerin Society meeting in 1947 
(at which Eucken participated along with Knight, Hayek, Popper and other renowned 
neoliberals), their underlying intellectual and religious motives diverged radically from one 
another. Genealogy concerns the core intellectual concepts, concerns and problems, not simply 
formal adherence to an intellectual or political doctrine. Indeed, if one looked solely at Luther's 
(1966a) specific economic doctrines on, for example, interest-rate policy, then there would be 
hardly any Lutheranism left in Europe in the 20ths Century. But parts of Luther did live on, as 
we shall see, not only in political ethics but also in early ordoliberalism's intellectual edifice, 
while other parts of Luther survived in other traditions that political ethics and ordoliberalism 
vehemently opposed. Thus, it is not simply a question of Luther or not Luther, but of a certain 
discursive continuity from specific aspects of Luther's writings to early ordoliberalism, 
alongside other discursive continuities (undoubtedly of equal importance, but the topic of other 
research). In this way, focusing on concerns, concepts and problems rather than points of 
consensus or doctrinal overlap has the analytical advantage of specifying the diversity and even 
disagreements and contradictions within an ideology (organised around the same problem), 
while maintaining a relatively sharp distinction between ideologies (organised around different 
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problems), even when their respective protagonists may agree or compromise on certain 
political or theoretical points.  
 
3. Lutheran Evangelical Roots of Early Ordoliberalism 
An illuminating point of entry to the collective endeavour of the early ordoliberal thinkers to 
develop a distinct Lutheran Evangelical approach to economic and political theory is found in 
the so-called Bonhoeffer Denkschrift of the ‘Freiburger Circle’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979). This  
1943 underground memorandum was named after the pastor and co-founder of the Confessing 
Church, the anti-Nazi branch of Evangelicalism in Germany, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was 
executed for his opposition to the regime and his attempts to corporate with Allied forces in 
1945. The Memorandum sketches a religious, social and economic order for post-Nazi 
Germany (Freiburger Kreis, 1979). It counts key figures of early ordoliberalism among its 
authors: the economists Walter Eucken and Adolf Lampe, the jurist Franz Böhm, and the 
polyhistor Constantin von Dietze. (What later became known as the ‘Freiburger School’ of 
economics is in fact synonymous with a number of key figures of early ordoliberalism, such as 
Eucken, Böhm, Miksch and Großmann-Doerth.) 
What brought the ‘Freiburger circle’ together in 1938 following the Kristallnacht on 9 
November, in which a violent pogrom against Jews was instigated throughout Germany, was 
the need felt by the authors to reflect upon the ‘assignments (Aufgaben) of Christians and the 
Church in our time’ (Thielicke, 1979, p. 7; Manow, 2001, pp. 85–86). The Memorandum 
already invokes ‘Christian conscience’ in its subtitle and opens not with what must be done 
politically, but with a theological discussion of Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Romans and its 
interpretation by Luther and contemporary German theologians. In other words, a fundamental 
theological problem was identified, whose solution was considered by the early ordoliberals to 
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be a pre-requisite for engaging in political and economic questions. In particular, the authors 
are concerned with the injunction to obey ‘worldly authorities’ (Rom. 13,2). In other words, the 
problem that must be solved before the authors can even begin the discussion of politics is the 
very legitimacy of the Memorandum as an act of revolt against Nazi rule and hence an apparent 
violation of the Pauline injunction.  
The authors unsurprisingly conclude that their project is legitimate, but add that more 
theological groundwork remains to be done before politics can enter the picture. In a long 
historical analysis following the initial discussion of Romans, the Memorandum makes an 
extensive argument about the crisis of capitalism and the Nazi rise to power as the end-result 
of a long process of ‘secularisation’, initiated with the Enlightenment and through which 
Western societies have abandoned God and deified man (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, pp. 41–54). 
Finally, the Memorandum turns to a discussion of a central problem in Lutheran Evangelical 
theology: Are human beings capable of producing any political and social improvements 
whatsoever, given that man is sinful and without justice? Again, the authors conclude that there 
is a marginal space of possibility for them to formulate their vision of Germany’s political 
future. The literature on early ordoliberalism has almost exclusively focused on its visions for 
economic, legal and political order, but in the Memorandum these topics are relegated to the 
appendices, clearly indicating the hierarchy of problems and the order in which they thought 
these problems could be adequately dealt with. While there are several other instances of 
Lutheran discourse in the writings of the early ordoliberals, as we shall see, this is what makes 
the Memorandum a particularly appropriate starting-point for the present analysis.  
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3.1. Faith, Love and Worldly Authority from Saint Paul to Luther  
Lutheran Evangelical theology breaks radically with widespread commonplaces about 
Christianity as a humanist religion, as it rejects notions of ‘good deeds’ or a ‘just’ human 
society, claiming instead that ‘loving one’s neighbour’ can involve punishing and even killing. 
Lutheran Evangelicalism thus distinguishes itself clearly both from the mainly Anglo-Saxon 
Calvinist sects analysed by Weber (1965) and from the 19th-century German tradition of liberal 
humanist and historicist Protestantism.  
Two points in Romans are critical to Lutheran Evangelicalism. First, the essence and 
fulfilment of the law has nothing to do with acting in accordance with the Biblical 
commandments, for ‘a person is justified by faith apart from works prescribed by the law’ 
(Rom. 3,28). Second, worldly authorities must be obeyed, since ‘whoever resists authority 
resists what God has appointed’ (Rom. 13,2). In Luther’s (Luther, 1966b [1523]) reading, what 
ties the two points together is the doctrine of ‘two Kingdoms’. These are a worldly one of the 
‘flesh’ (all that is human and worldly: Desire and egoism) and a heavenly one of the ‘heart’ (all 
that is spiritual: Faith and love). This leads to Luther’s peculiar conception of obedience and 
freedom. Worldly authorities are appointed by God to maintain social order, punish evildoers 
and make it possible for believers to be good Christians. Therefore, Christians must obey 
worldly authorities. But their worldly servitude has no impact on their spiritual freedom since 
‘it is impossible to command anyone to believe in this or that, or to force him with violence 
[gewallt]’ (Luther, 1966b [1523], 264, 1984 [1520], 10). Similarly, Calvin – also in a discussion 
of Romans – stresses that ‘spiritual freedom can very well coexist with civil servitude’ (Calvin, 
1911 [1541], 754).  
Freedom in faith is what allows the Christian to make him- or herself a slave to their 
neighbour in the name of love and to worldly authority in the name of obedience. As Saint Paul 
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says to the Galatians: ‘You were called to freedom, brothers and sisters; only do not use your 
freedom as an opportunity for self-indulgence, but through love become slaves to one another’ 
(Gal. 5, 13). The ‘freedom of a Christian’ has nothing to do with ‘the flesh’ – nor, by extension, 
with political, economic, material or even physical freedom. Even if granted such rights, the 
Christian remains a slave in worldly affairs because his or her faith dictates him to 
unconditionally serve the neighbour (Luther, 1984 [1520]). This is why Luther can 
paradoxically claim that ‘of all human beings the Christian is both the most free lord, subjected 
to none, and the most dutiful slave, subjected to everyone’ (Luther, 1984, p. 8, see also 1960 
[1515/1516], 340). 
This relates directly to Luther’s view that humans do not know justice and therefore cannot 
ingratiate themselves before God through any outward act whatsoever. They can only do so 
through faith in God, accepting their own ignorance and fallibility. The ensuing self-effacing 
obedience is Luther’s very definition of love, understood as the rebuffing of the flesh in 
servitude of one’s neighbour (see Rom. 13,8). In other words, love is neither an emotional bond 
nor a specific kind of action towards other individuals, but a relationship of pure faith to God, 
and only through that to the world. Accordingly, when Jesus says that we should ‘not resist an 
evildoer’ (Matt. 5,39), on this reading it does not refer to any human standard of justice, such 
as pacifism, but to the abolition of all human conceptions of justice as instances of the flesh 
(Luther, 1966b, 1984). ‘[D]o not claim to be wiser than you are. Do not repay anyone evil for 
evil … Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave room for the wrath of God’ (Rom. 12,16-
21). 
To Luther, this is how ‘loving one’s neighbour’ and ‘obeying worldly authorities’ fit 
together. Since worldly authorities are appointed by God to punish evildoers, all our outward 
acts in its service are just by definition – that is, as long as they are not motivated by personal 
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desires but by obedience and faith. In other words, ‘love’ may imply punishing and even killing 
one’s neighbour in the name of the worldly authority (Luther, 1966b, pp. 265–266). This is why 
Luther would incite authorities to ‘hurl at, strangle and stab, secretly or in public,’ the ‘predatory 
and murderous rats’ of the peasantry who had revolted for political and economic rights (despite 
Luther’s sympathy for their cause), for ‘nothing can be more poisonous, pernicious, devilish 
than a mutinous man’ (Luther, 1964 [1525], 358). The knight waging his sword against the 
rebels should not fear violating the Biblical commandments – not even ‘You shall not murder’ 
(Ex. 20,13) – for ‘he is God’s official and the servant of his wrath’ (Luther, 1964, p. 360).  
The essence of both Good and Evil in Luther is spiritual rather than actual, and the Biblical 
commandments conceived in terms of ‘faith alone’ concern not so much the person who 
actually murders, but first of all the person who is ‘angry with a brother or sister’ (Matt. 5, 21). 
As Calvin (1911, pp. 118–119) explains based on Paul, the evangelium (‘good news’, that is, 
the Gospel) of Jesus is not a correction of the Law of Moses, but places it in the heart. 
 
3.2. Political Ethics and the Concept of Order  
In the early 20th century, Protestantism in Germany was little concerned with the anti-humanist 
side of Luther. The dominant tradition of ‘liberal’ Protestantism with its roots in 
Schleiermacher’s (2012 [1799]) Kantian idealism was based on humanism, historicism and a 
belief in social progress and justice (Barth, 2010, pp. xii–xxvi; Carroll, 2009; Gogarten, 1932, 
p. 1). But then a young theologian, Karl Barth (2010 [1919/1922]), published a landmark work 
on Romans that revitalised and radicalised Luther’s reading with the severity of a twentieth-
century continental philosopher. Barth would become one of the most influential Protestant 
theologians of the twentieth century as well as an opponent of the ‘German Christians’, who 
were the proxies in theology of the Nazi regime. To him, faith was not an emotional or 
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conscious state of mind (Bultmann, 1993, p. 22). His ‘dialectical’ theology has little to do with 
Hegel’s dynamic syntheses. To Barth, there are not just two Kingdoms, but a radical divide 
between humankind and God. Not only can no human conception of justice measure up to that 
of God – divine justice is beyond human measurability, incomprehensible not only to human 
intellect but also sentiment (Barth, 2010, p. 39). Only ‘as the unknown God is God known’ 
(Barth, 2010, p. 57). Therefore, humans must refrain from ‘all positive and negative evaluations 
[Bewertungen] and judgements’ (Barth, 2010, p. 451). The only ethics that can be derived from 
the Gospel is ‘critique of all ethos’ (Barth, 2010, p. 451).  
In other words, the Pauline injunction to obey worldly authorities is ‘as an ethical concept 
purely negative’ – an injunction of ‘non-rebellion’ (Barth, 2010, p. 507). Being human, worldly 
authority is not just, but since rebellion against it will always invoke some human conception 
of justice, rebellion as such is ‘awelessness and insubordination’ (Barth, 2010, p. 39). The only 
Good is the negation of everything human: ‘the abolition of the subject, … the non-acting in 
every act’ (Barth, 2010, p. 513). ‘Love’ is the name of that negation as the negation of the 
‘flesh’ because all it means is ‘to not resist’ (Barth, 2010, p. 518). Thus defined as a pure 
negation, love is not an act: ‘“to subject oneself” is no act’ (Barth, 2010, p. 517).  
Barth thought he had effectively ruled out any conception of ethics beyond this pure 
negation, excluding any opposition to worldly order on that basis. But ten years later, with the 
Great Depression, widespread opposition to parliamentary democracy and a generalised sense 
of civilizational crisis among the German intelligentsia, followers such as Emil Brunner and 
Friedrich Gogarten began to explore the space for ‘political ethics’ within the confines of 
Lutheran Evangelical theology. While Barth (1934, 2010, pp. xxvi–xxxi) vehemently opposed 
their endeavour, they saw Luther’s concept of ‘order’ as the solid ground for an anti-humanist 
Christian political ethics based on love and obedience (Gogarten, 1932, pp. 1–4, 32–33). To 
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Brunner and Gogarten, the concept of orders solves the paradox in Saint Paul between 
authorities as simultaneously human and divine. Brunner and Gogarten were not only early 
members of the Barth-centred magazine ‘Between the Times’ (Zwischen den Zeiten), but are 
also particularly interesting to focus on here because they went further than their close and 
likewise influential peers Bultmann and Thurneysen in taking the discussion of ethics away 
from the existential level of Kierkegaard and Heidegger to the political level. Also, they are 
mentioned in a few places by early ordoliberals, albeit only in brief. 
Brunner (1978 [1932], 46) explains that the ‘ethical demand’ of Christianity is ‘no abstract 
law, no pre-determinable, codifiable “program”, but the letting-one-be-determined through the 
You [the neighbour] in the concrete situation’. Again, the essence of Christian ethics is not 
action, but obedience in freedom, faith and love as the absence of human desire and egoism 
(Brunner, 1978, pp. 69–70; see also Gogarten, 1932, p. 53).  Freedom can therefore coexist with 
state authority and even coercion, but Brunner also recognises that there is an inbuilt ethics of 
inequality here. We must love the concrete neighbour that God has sent our way as our 
‘assignment’ (Aufgabe, the notion also found in the Memorandum) and therefore accept the 
social position we have been given in the ‘divine “orders”’ (Brunner, 1978 [1932], p. 80). ‘[T]he 
equal worth [of all humans] before God in no way means equality in historical life’ (Brunner, 
1978, p. 197). Humanist and individualist notions of fundamental equality are anti-Christian, 
for humans are created as ‘old and young, child and father, leader [Führer] and those who are 
led’ (Brunner, 1978, p. 196).  
This is the foundation for Brunner’s and Gogarten’s ‘political ethics’. Since human beings 
are radically sinful, they are capable of creating nothing but a ‘Chaos’ of violently opposing 
egoist forces (Gogarten, 1932, p. 195).  But God has given humans the various orders as social 
structures that can curb the effects of Evil. The content of these structures is not pre-given. 
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Rather, it is the ‘assignment’ of historical human beings to fill them in. The orders are hence of 
a double nature: divine and sinful (Brunner, 1978 [1932], p. 434). But worldly authority is not 
the only order – marriage, the church and other orders are equally important. In fact, it is not 
the specific authority, but rather the divine order of authority as such that humans must serve. 
The former must be served only as a consequence of the latter. This distinction intentionally 
leaves a slim opening for legitimate revolt and for a return of ethos in Lutheran Evangelicalism 
that was not present for Barth. Because of the double nature of the orders as both divine and 
human, it is not enough to ‘submit oneself and accept’ the orders (as Barth argued), one must 
also ‘resist and protest’ because ‘true faith’ implies ‘the will to improve them to the extent 
possible’ as a necessary part of ‘obedience to God’s commandment’ (Brunner, 1978, pp. 201–
202). The question, then, is how to do so. 
Simply loving the specific individual next to me would not lift humanity out of Chaos 
because it would not rise above the level of human sin. But the divine orders cut through Chaos, 
and therefore serving them will do so too. In other words, loving one’s neighbour must follow 
servitude to God’s orders, not the other way around. According to Brunner, ‘the first service to 
love that is required from man is to assist in the orders’, ‘be it ever so imperfect, crude and 
“loveless”’, ever so ‘factual-technical’, since the present order ‘is right now the only dam 
against Chaos’ (Brunner, 1978, p. 207).  
Not only does serving the orders sometimes ‘necessitate the use of force, perhaps of 
physical violence and even killing’ (Brunner, 1978, p. 209; see also Althaus, 1923, p. 25). We 
also encounter a new distinction between egoism and the ‘factual-technical’ service to the 
orders. The ‘true authority’ is neutral and objective because rooted in the divine orders and 
hence untainted by the struggles between the opposing egoistic desires of human individuals or 
groups (Brunner, 1978, p. 434). Authority – ‘wherever one is put above another … not as an 
20 
 
individual, but as the bearer of an office’ – is therefore decisive in ‘setting up barriers to the 
hatred and hostility of men’, an assignment taken on by the state in modern Western societies 
(Gogarten, 1932, pp. 108–109). In the words of Althaus (1923, pp. 18–19), even ‘the irrational 
freedom of love’ presupposes a legal order and can only occur in an ‘ordered society’. 
 
3.3. Ordoliberalism as Lutheran Evangelical Political Ethics 
We can now better understand why the 1943 Bonhoeffer Memorandum needed to debate the 
Pauline injunctions and analyse 150 years of ‘secularisation’ (the historical process of man’s 
‘self-deification’) before providing any specific details of their post-war political vision. 
Without a solid assertion that ‘Christian consciousness’ had gone out the window with Nazism, 
Communism and laissez faire capitalism, any critique of these regimes would simply have been 
pitting one human sense of justice against another; that is, it would be aweless revolt and 
resisting the evildoer. ‘There is no perfect justice on earth’ and any belief in the capacity of 
humans to produce one – even that of Christians – is ‘superstition which ignores the sinful 
depravity of any human work’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 55). Only because authority, too, has 
been corrupted by human egoism and idolatry is resistance legitimate in order to restore the 
divine orders. Their affiliation with the political activist Dietrich Bonhoeffer shows how the 
early ordoliberals had come to distance themselves from Barth’s original position, but close 
reading of the text also shows how they were still deeply concerned with the same fundamental 
theological problems he – and Brunner and Gogarten – dealt with. 
To the authors of the Memorandum, the solution is not so simple as introducing some form 
of Christian state. The Gospel does not provide a set of rules that, if implemented, would make 
worldly society just. On this reading there is no ‘natural law’, as the Catholics hold – but there 
is ‘a Christian attitude towards the “world”, which it orders on the basis of faith’ (Freiburger 
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Kreis, 1979, p. 102). The central problem for political ethics, therefore, according to the 
Memorandum, resides in the radical division between humankind and God, which is at once 
epistemological and ontological. Epistemological because ‘God alone is truly just, but he is a 
hidden (verborgener) God – his justice is not our justice (Rom. 9,20)’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, 
p. 55). (This echo of Barth’s ‘unknown God’ is clear.) Ontological because, contrary to worldly 
authority, ‘The Kingdom of God is a Kingdom of Love, not an order based on a legal order, not 
politics and not authoritative power (Gewalt)’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 55). Yet, echoing 
Brunner’s ‘true authority’, state authority must be ‘real authority’ based on trust, faith and 
loyalty, according to the Memorandum (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 76). 
Just as for Brunner and Gogarten, the combination of orders and the ‘Christian attitude’ of 
faith, love and obedience solves the problem of political ethics, according to the Memorandum. 
While no positive human order can be just, not even if based on the commandments of the 
Gospel, obeying – but also supporting and developing – the given human orders out of faith is 
a legitimate ethical demand because it curbs human evil (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, pp. 102–103).  
In Brunner, the central problem is that orders are simultaneously ‘references to God’s will 
to community’ and ‘tools of an evil violent collective egoism, the instruments of tyranny’ 
(Brunner, 1978, p. 201). More specifically, ‘the scream from millions “Give us work!” is a 
novelty in world history’ – both understandable and deplorable, but also threatening to invade 
the state with class interests and hence with human egoism, desires and idolatrous sense of 
justice (Brunner, 1978, p. 379). Likewise, in the Memorandum, state authority ‘serves the 
Good’ as a ‘moral ordering power’ although it is based on ‘the sword’, that is, on violent force 
(Freiburger Kreis, 1979, pp. 55–56). ‘But the possession of power also contains a temptation to 
abuse, to arbitrariness’ that threatens to ‘destroy the moral conditions and mutual confidence’ 
and to ‘produce hostility and hatred instead of love’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 65). 
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Accordingly, ‘there is no demon that so pressingly needs to be tamed and chained as the demon 
of power’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 65).  
The demon of power cannot be controlled by moral conscience alone, it requires the 
institution of ‘political organs of control’ vis-à-vis the rulers. Yet, although the traditional 
liberal means to that end, such as parliament, division of powers, free press, and so on, ‘have 
not been entirely useless’, they ‘remain imperfect and produce new great dangers’ by 
threatening that the state will be infiltrated by ‘the specific interests of single classes, business 
groups, and parties’ and more generally that the ‘politization of the nation’ will eventually entail 
propaganda and national idolatry (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, pp. 66–67). Again, state authority, 
therefore, must be ‘true authority, that is, it must rest on trust instead of dumb and blind 
submission’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 76).  
 
3.4. The Order of the early Ordoliberals 
Just as in the views of Brunner and Gogarten, it is not the state as such, but the authority needed 
to implement the divine orders that the early ordoliberals called for. In fact, they saw it as 
equally important to control the powers of the state against abuse from those in a position to 
exploit them. Walter Eucken was extremely critical of the ‘passionate belief in the state’ of his 
time across the political spectrum and held that it would have to be replaced by ‘belief in God’ 
for the state to have a solid foundation and not come to oppress individual freedom (Eucken, 
1932a, pp. 86–87). The state is a means to curb ‘collective egoism’ in mass society. As Eucken 
later puts it in his first ‘principle of economic policy’: ‘The policy of the state should aim at 
absolving economic power groups or to limit their functions … Every consolidation of power 
groups strengthens the neo-feudal diminishing of the authority of the state’ (Eucken, 2004 
[1955], 334; see also Dietze, 1947).  
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The ordoliberal solution to the problem of a strong state whose powers are not themselves 
abused aligns with Brunner’s insistence that the implementation of the orders was ‘factual-
technical’. For Eucken (1934, 1939) the task more specifically becomes ‘objective’ and 
‘scientific’. According to Dietze (1947, p. 41), theology only provides insight into the negative 
character of the divine orders, but the positive substance of the orders ought to rely on the 
authority of the social sciences, not least economics. Roughly put, the early ordoliberals saw 
the technocratic state as the divine solution (guaranteed by objective science) to the problem of 
human power and sin.  
This explains the strange combination of market and state in early ordoliberalism. They did 
not promote a ‘strong state’ as such, only as a ‘true authority’, that is, a protector of the divine 
orders. Similarly, they did not support free markets as such, only as an objective, that is, non-
human mechanism of social order. Their rejection of laissez-faire capitalism was precisely 
motivated by (a) spurning belief in a substantial (rather than negative) divine social order that 
will support itself independently of human ‘assignments’ and (b) eliminating the processes not 
only of proletarisation and brutalisation, but also of man’s self-deification, an outcome that the 
classical liberal belief in an ontological harmony and ignorance of divine ‘assignments’ had 
historically entailed.  
Müller-Armack, who was the first to coin the term ‘social market economy’ in 1946 
(Manow, 2010), expanded the Memorandum’s analysis of the process of ‘secularisation’ 
through which man had ‘deified’ himself during ‘the century without God’, culminating in 
laissez-faire Capitalism, Communism, Nazism and WWII. Müller-Armack called for a ‘re-
Christianization’ of Western culture as ‘the only realistic possibility to counter its inner decay 
in the final last hour’ (Müller-Armack, 1968b [1948], 486). For Rüstow (2001 [1945]), too, also 
writing in the wake of the war and echoing Müller-Armack’s (1968a, p. 499) claim that ‘the 
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worldly belief in harmony of secularised liberalism [is] incompatible with the acceptance of a 
true transcendence’, attacked the ‘deist’ ‘belief in harmony’ of the classical liberals, according 
to which God’s orders were self-fulfilling ‘if only man kept his finger away’ (Rüstow, 1955, p. 
60). Echoing the language of political ethics and the Memorandum, ‘man has his assignments 
[Aufgaben] in this world, sometimes very hard assignments’, according to Rüstow (1955, p. 
60). The rejection of a deist belief in God-given order is particularly worth noting as some 
scholars have attributed precisely that view to early ordoliberalism in a secularised form 
(Streeck, 2015, pp. 363–364; Hien, 2017a, p. 269).  
 
3.5. Competition Order 
Eucken argues that ‘competition order’ is ‘the only type of order that bends the powers of 
egoism’ by ‘forcing even the pure egoists to work for the common interest’ without leading to 
the abuse of state power (see also Böhm, 1937, pp. 19–21; Eucken, 2004, p. 365). In 
competition order, a strict legal order, notably a strong constitution, ensures that the state can 
guarantee market competition without exposing itself to the dangers of power concentration of 
laissez faire because it remains as de-politicised as possible. A strong, de-politicised and 
technocratic state and a competitive market complement each other to counter power 
concentration. The market exposes every individual, firm or group to constant competitive 
pressure, maintained by the state, which, in turn, is governed by a strong constitutional order so 
as to avoid the arbitrariness of group interests. In this way, egoism is not simply blocked – it is 
organised so as to serve the common good, and it is the assignment of economic policy to 
control and coordinate individual interests (Eucken, 2004, p. 360). Rüstow (1955, p. 58) calls 
this ‘the stroke of genius of the market economy’. As Manow (2010, pp. 10–11) puts it: ‘For 
25 
 
the ordoliberals, the price mechanism is not primarily a means to the efficient allocation of 
factors, but an instrument of discipline.’  
Just as in Lutheran Evangelical political ethics, the root cause of all evil is not in any 
particular action, but in egoistic intentionality. According to Böhm, orders ‘in themselves’ are 
innocent – but they are ‘vulnerable to the evil intentions of people through the abuse of the 
orders’ (Manow, 2008, p. 125). The problem with all other economic orders than competition 
is that they cannot control the powers of egoism and will therefore eventually have to turn to 
the use of force and ‘eventually to the reign of terror … ending with the concentration camp or 
the infamous bullet in the back of the head’ (Rüstow, 1955, p. 58). Indeed, evil breeds evil, and 
when one seeks to resist the evildoer one will end up doing evil too.  
The Memorandum explains that it is not so much the acting in one’s self-interest in a 
competitive market that is evil, but ‘the demon of Greed’; ‘not the enjoyment [Genuß] of 
worldly goods as such, but the love of pleasure [Genußsucht], the egoism of enjoyment – in one 
word: the materialist attitude’ (Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 91). Similarly, it is not exploitation 
and the defeating of competitors in the market in itself that is evil, but the ‘egoistic exploitation 
of one’s neighbour’ and the ‘reckless defeating of competitors’ that economic order must curb 
(Freiburger Kreis, 1979, p. 91, my italics). In other words, egoism is only evil in so far as it is 
spiritual egoism.  
By 1955, Rüstow characterises his younger self of the 1920s as an ‘eager socialist’ because 
of his Christian conception of ‘solidarity’ at the time (shared by many Catholics) as largely 
incommensurable with market economy: when human beings compete with each other in 
economic life, they are not solidary (Rüstow, 1955, p. 54). While in 1955 he continues to 
believe that solidarity is ‘the necessary relationship between human beings – conform with both 
duty and human nature’, he has come to a different conception of it through ‘difficult inner 
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struggles’ (Rüstow, 1955, p. 54). ‘[T]he fair competition of performance 
[Leistungskonkurrenz]’, through ‘the wonderful automatism in the market economy’, in fact 
serves one’s neighbour by letting the person who ‘produces best and cheapest’ prevail, which 
is precisely ‘in the interest of the consumer and the community’ (Rüstow, 1955, p. 57). The 
pursuit of self-preservation and even prosperity in the market economy is thus not ‘egoism in 
the negative, censuring sense of a sinful self-drive’ (Rüstow, 1955, p. 57). Rüstow continues: 
‘Significantly, the Gospel says: “love your neighbour as yourself …” That one must love and 
take care of oneself is obviously presupposed. Only, one should not treat one’s neighbour … 
any worse than one treats oneself’ (Rüstow, 1955, p. 58). As Brunner had it: ‘Even a capitalist 
can be an anti-capitalist “in the heart”’ (Brunner, 1978, p. 408). 
 
4. The Difference between Calvinist-Lutheran Neoliberalism and Calvinist-
Lutheran Ordoliberalism 
The present state of scholarly discussion over the religious roots of early ordoliberalism is 
caught up with questions of Lutheranism versus Calvinism that have their origin in Weber’s 
somewhat schematic accounts in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. It is 
important to move away from these and see that both ordoliberalism and Anglo-Saxon laissez-
faire liberalism are rooted in both Calvinism and Lutheranism, but in different ways.  
Weber argues that the Calvinist sects of the Reformation were the germ for the secularised 
spirit of rational-calculating striving for profit and a ceaseless concern with accumulation that 
took hold in Northern Europe in the 19th century. The ‘vocational duty’ of Protestantism, 
according to Weber (1965, p. 60), was placed above the person and paved the way for a 
secularised work ethic. In sharp opposition to the Catholic monastic ideals of withdrawal from 
the world and charity, vocation was seen as equivalent to Christian love by the Protestants 
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(Weber, 1965, p. 68). Weber claims that Luther remained a ‘traditionalist’ and that the concept 
of predestination ‘took no central position with him’ – only with the Calvinist sects, who hence 
constitute the ‘ideal type’ of the movement (Weber, 1965, p. 120). From this concept, according 
to Weber, sprang the idea of being of use to one’s neighbour, and through this the secularised 
current of utilitarianism (Weber, 1965, pp. 126–127). 
The Calvinist sects may well have thought of Luther as a lukewarm traditionalist, but he 
certainly did not appear like this to the leading theologians of Lutheran Evangelical political 
ethics. In direct opposition to Weber, Gogarten explicitly rejects the sectarian movements of 
the Reformation as the origins of modern-day individualism and humanism and contrasts these 
to his own return to Luther and Calvin themselves (Gogarten, 1932, p. 120; see also Althaus, 
1923, p. 15). We have seen how Calvin and Luther agreed on the importance and meaning of 
Romans. Moreover, it is simply erroneous to think that Calvin (1911, p. 471) differed from 
Luther in his views about predestination. According to Luther, it is ‘the eternal providence of 
God’ that decides ‘who are to believe or not, [and who] are released from sin or not, so that it 
is entirely out of our hands and alone in God’s hand whether we shall be pious or not’ (Luther, 
1931 [1522], p. 22). But contrary to the Calvinist sects, the Lutheran Evangelicals were to read 
this not so much in terms of an orthodoxy about a predetermined future, but rather in light of 
the Pauline tenets that man does not know justice, is incapable of doing good and can ingratiate 
himself by no act whatsoever. On this anti-humanist and anti-individualist basis, they forcefully 
rejected the utilitarianism and the concomitant humanist ethics based on absolute individual 
rights that were expounded by the Anglo-Saxon laissez faire liberals.  
The order theologians and early ordoliberals knew Weber and his secularisation thesis very 
well (Brunner, 1978, p. 439; Eucken, 1934, p. 20, 2004, p. 73; Müller-Armack, 1968a, p. x). 
But where Weber was influenced by ‘liberal’ Protestantism (Carroll, 2009) and died in 1920, 
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they adhered to the competing tradition of Lutheran Evangelicalism and spoke against the 
backdrop of Barth’s theological revolt, as well as the worldwide economic and political crisis 
of the 1930s. Therefore, where Weber sees a unique process of social and historical progress, 
the Lutheran Evangelicals perceived a dystopic process of man’s ‘self-deification’. According 
to their secularisation thesis it was precisely because the notion of vocation had been garbled 
and turned into a purely economic concept, losing its Christian foundation, that the world was 
experiencing generalised crisis (Brunner, 1978; Eucken, 1932b; Freiburger Kreis, 1979; 
Müller-Armack, 1948; Rüstow, 2001).  
Yes, the price mechanism disciplines man and even bears a promise of prosperity, but to 
the ordoliberals this does not mean that the bottom rock of the argument in its favour is 
individual rights and individual or social utility. Yes, private property and even democracy are 
to be defended, but not because they are just. The ‘unconditional, axiomatic belief in 
democracy’ and the ‘rationalist egalitarianism’ would have ‘fatal consequences’ on economic 
life (Brunner, 1978, p. 399). Eucken’s (1934, 1939, 2004) extensive arguments in favour of 
‘competition order’ is not that it is efficient or just, but that it is the only order form that has 
historically and theoretically proven itself capable of directing human egoism towards the 
common good and avoiding power abuse by interest groups through the state apparatus.  
As already mentioned, Luther held very different views than the ordoliberals on what we 
would today characterise as questions of economic doctrine, but the underlying concern of the 
ordoliberals is essentially that of Luther in his writing on merchants. Merchants, Luther (1966a 
[1524], pp. 294-295) says, have ‘opened all the doors and windows of Hell’ by thinking it their 
just right to take whatever price it is possible to obtain in the market for their goods, yet it is 
not theologically possible to formulate a law about prices against which merchants can be held 
accountable. It would perhaps be best, then, according to Luther, to have ‘worldly authority’ 
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hire ‘reasonable and honest people’ to establish the value of all commodities (Luther, 1966a, p. 
296). However, ‘we Germans are so concerned with drinking and dancing that we are not 
capable of upholding such regulations and order’, and so in the end we should opt for the 
second-best advice: ‘To let the commodity go at the price that it gives and takes in the common 
market … [and] let the proverb prevail: “Do as other people and you will not commit follies”’ 
(Luther, 1966a, p. 296).  
As Manow (2001, p. 193) argues, the market logic of ordoliberalism does not spring from 
individualism and utilitarianism, but from Protestant moralism and state philosophy. As a 
consequence, the ordoliberals did not support the traditional liberal night-watchman state, but 
instead a strong and neutral state capable of ‘targeted intervention’ (Eucken’s term), serving as 
a ‘market police’ upholding competition – a ‘third way’ and an alternative to both Communism 
and capitalism (Rüstow, 1955, pp. 62–63).  
 
5. Conclusion: The Formation and Structure of early Ordoliberalism 
The formation and structure of early ordoliberalism was rooted in the interwar Germanophone 
Lutheran Evangelical tradition of statism, anti-humanism and political ethics. It was 
fundamentally concerned with the problem that, following Barth, positive ‘Christian ethics’ had 
been rejected, while the ‘assignment’ of love to curb human evil remained. The genealogy of 
the concept of order from Luther’s meaning (worldly authority) over that of Brunner and 
Gogarten (true authority, divine order) to that of the early ordoliberals (competition order) 
reveals a history not only of normative and ideational overlaps, but more importantly of a 
continuity of concerns, concepts and problems across different and sometimes opposing 
positions within Lutheran political thought.  
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To the early ordoliberals, ‘competition order’ is not a just organisation of human society, 
but rather the only order that science confirms can exercise authority without power abuse. This 
was a problem already addressed by renowned contemporary Lutheran Evangelical theologians, 
of whom the early ordoliberals were well aware, particularly within the tradition of ‘political 
ethics’. While egoism is the root of all evil, the market is not more significantly a seedbed for 
egoism than any other order, because egoism is not an act, but a spiritual state. In fact, 
competition can curb the effects of egoism by anonymously and automatically opposing and 
counterbalancing individuals against each other. When competition is guarded by an equally 
neutral and objective, namely a de-politicised state, it becomes possible for Christians to truly 
love their neighbours and obey the divine orders in worldly servitude. 
It remains to be decided whether the Lutheran Evangelical roots of early ordoliberalism 
still play an important role today. But even if this turns out no longer to be the case, this article 
has contributed to ongoing debate about the greater or smaller importance of ordoliberalism to 
Germany’s line in the EU since 2007, mentioned in the introduction. Where this debate is 
focused on whether or not politicians have followed ordoliberal doctrines, the article suggests 
that it is not only normative and ideational consensus can define a political and economic 
ideology; it is also specific concerns, concepts and problems that may stretch across different 
political positions. It may very well be, then, that both sides in the debate about ordoliberalism 
today are partially correct.  
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